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Abstract
Will small countries deindustrialize when opening up to trade with large countries? Davis
(1998) shows that for the home market e⁄ect to lead to deindustrialization of small countries,
trade costs for homogenous goods must be su¢ ciently smaller than trade costs in di⁄erentiated
goods, a condition which is not supported by empirical evidence. We show that if di⁄erentiated
goods production uses tradeable inputs small countries can become deindustrialized when trading
with a su¢ ciently large country and if trade costs are low.
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JEL code: F1, R12
1 Introduction
The theoretical works on increasing returns, trade and the home market e⁄ect (Krugman 1980, Help-
man and Krugman 1985) have suggested that market size matters for industrial structure. In a
two-country model, economic integration may lead producers of di⁄erentiated goods under increasing
returns to scale to move their production away from the small economy to the large economy so as
to save on transport costs. This leads to the so-called "home market e⁄ect" and the small economy
then becomes relatively more specialized in the homogenous goods. If we consider homogenous goods
as comprising of mainly agricultural products and commodities while di⁄erentiated goods are indus-
trial goods, the home market e⁄ect implies that small economies may deindustrialize with economic
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1integration. Davis (1998), however, shows that such a result depends crucially on the assumption
that trade costs in the homogenous good are su¢ ciently lower than that of di⁄erentiated goods. As
pointed out by Davis, existing empirical evidence does not provide any support for the assumption
that homogenous goods incur lower transport costs. Davis therefore concludes that small economies
need not fear deindustrialization stemming from opening to trade.
Following the work of Davis, several authors have re-examined the link between market size and
industrial structure in the presence of transport costs in the homogenous good sector. Holmes and
Stevens (2005) argue that if the ￿rms have technologies that have a ￿nite minimum e¢ cient scale, then
the home market e⁄ect may reemerge in the sectors experiencing highest increasing returns. Since the
homogenous good is not traded in their model, small economies do not become deindustrialized. Yu
(2005) shows that the home market e⁄ect can arise, disappear or reverse in sign, depending on the
demand elasticity between the homogenous good and the composite of di⁄erentiated goods.1 He also
shows that small economies may have a larger (smaller) industrial sector after opening to trade if the
demand elasticity is higher (smaller) than one and if transport costs are low enough. The homogenous
good remains non-traded in his model. Thus Yu￿ s model cannot capture the other e⁄ect of trade on
industrial structure, namely, that small countries may become deindustrialized by becoming relatively
more specialized in and exporting the homogenous good with trade. This latter e⁄ect is in the original
spirit of Krugman￿ s (1980) argument.
In this paper we show that if the production of di⁄erentiated goods uses tradeable inputs2 which
are produced under constant returns to scale and whose trade is governed by Ricardian comparative
advantage, a small economy may become deindustrialized with trade under certain conditions. In
line with previous literature, deindustrialization refers to the case whereby there is a reallocation of a
country￿ s labor force from the industrial sector towards the production of the homogenous good. We
consider the intermediate goods as consisting of basic industrial materials and hence a country is only
considered as deindustrialized with trade if it devotes more resources to the production of homogenous
goods and less to the production of ￿nal di⁄erentiated and intermediate goods compared to autarky.
In our paper a country becomes deindustrialized if it is an exporter of the homogenous good under
trade. Deindustrialization takes place if transport costs are low, the trading partner is large enough
and if the small economy has a higher import content in the production of di⁄erentiated goods than
1See also Crozet and Trionfetti (2007) who ￿nd a home market e⁄ect by getting rid of the homogenous good
whatsoever and analyze a model of Head and Ries (2002) with a di⁄erentiated and an Armington sector.
2See for example Hummels et al. (2001) on the large and increasing over time import content of OECD countries
production and exports.
2its trading partner. We also show a surprising result that under some parameter values (in particular,
if the size di⁄erential between the two trading countries is very large), it is the large country that
becomes deindustrialized. This result is di⁄erent from the existing literature on the home market
e⁄ect reversal whereby the large country is a net importer of di⁄erentiated goods and an exporter of
homogenous good (see Feenstra et al. (2001), Head, Mayer and Ries (2002), and Yu (2005)). This
is because in our model the large country is a net exporter of the di⁄erentiated good as well as the
homogenous good while being an importer of the intermediate good.
To understand the role played by imported intermediates, consider ￿rst the case where there is no
imported intermediate input, that is, if the di⁄erentiated good is produced with 100% local labor, as
in Krugman (1980). Then the relative cost of production of the di⁄erentiated good is just the inverse
of the relative wage of the two countries. When transport costs are equal in both the di⁄erentiated
good and the homogenous good sector, the small country￿ s wage has to be su¢ ciently smaller than
the large country for it to be an exporter of the homogenous good. But at this wage, a ￿nal good
producing ￿rm in the small country will su⁄er no disadvantage in serving the large country compared
to a ￿rm locating in the large country since the low production cost is su¢ cient to compensate for the
transport cost. On the other hand, it enjoys a cost advantage in serving its small domestic market
while avoiding the transport cost faced by producers from the large country at the same time. Thus
all producers would want to locate in the small country. As a result, the relative wage cannot fall so
much as to warrant trade in the homogenous good and the home market e⁄ect cannot hold. This is
the essence of the argument in Davis (1998). However, if the production of the di⁄erentiated good uses
some imported inputs, the wage di⁄erence does not translate fully into a corresponding di⁄erence in
production costs. The larger the proportion of imported intermediate input in the production of the
￿nal good, the less sensitive will be the production cost to changes in the local wage. Therefore, even
when the wage in the small country is su¢ ciently small for it to be an exporter of the homogenous
good, the production cost in the small country may not be su¢ ciently low to compensate ￿rms for the
transport costs incurred in serving the large market. Thus ￿rms may still prefer to locate in the large
country if the savings on transport costs more than compensate for the higher cost of production.
The small country may then become deindustrialized if it needs to export the homogenous good to
cover the trade imbalance in di⁄erentiated and intermediate goods.
To illustrate our idea we consider two trading countries that produce three goods ￿homogenous,
intermediate and ￿nal di⁄erentiated goods. Homogenous goods are produced using only local labor
under a constant returns to scale technology. There are also two varieties of intermediate goods and
both are produced under constant returns to scale using local labor. We assume that each country
3has a Ricardian technological advantage in the production of one variety su¢ ciently large that under
trade each country will specialize in the production of one variety only. Final di⁄erentiated goods
are produced under increasing returns to scale using the two varieties of intermediate inputs. Our
objective is to examine the implications on the industrial structure and trading patterns as the relative
size of the two trading economies increases from one.
When the size of one of the trading country increases, there are two opposing forces a⁄ecting its
trade balance and hence its relative wage. On the one hand, ￿nal goods industries may want to relocate
to the larger country to save on transport costs (the home market e⁄ect) increasing its net exports
of di⁄erentiated good and this tends to raise the relative wage of the large country. On the other
hand, the larger country requires more imported intermediate input from the small country both for
its production for local consumption and for its exports of ￿nal goods. This tends to lower its relative
wage. When trade costs are low, the home market e⁄ect dominates and the relative wage of the small
country falls as size of the large country increases. If this fall in wage is su¢ cient, then the small
country may become the exporter of the homogenous good and thus deindustrializes. Note however,
that before the wage di⁄erential reaches such a value, it is possible that the ￿nal good industry will
have moved completely to the large country. In this case the relative wage of the small country will
not fall further as the size of the large country increases but instead will increase as the demand for the
intermediate input it produces increases with the size of the large country. Thus deindustrialization of
the small country takes place only under certain parameter values. In particular, trade costs need to
be low and the small country producers have to use the imported intermediate more intensively in its
￿nal good production than the large country. Furthermore, once all ￿nal goods industries have moved
to the large country and the small country￿ s relative wage starts increasing as the size of the large
country increases, there will come a point at which the large country￿ s relative wage is su¢ ciently
low for it to become an exporter of the homogenous good. Thus the large country can deindustrialize
while being a net exporter of the di⁄erentiated goods.
Our results depend crucially on the assumption that the homogenous good uses less imported
intermediate input than the di⁄erentiated good. Also for deindustrialization to occur, we need that
the small country uses a greater proportion of imported inputs in its production of di⁄erentiated goods
than that of the large country. How realistic are these assumptions? To get an estimate we present
in Table 1 the value of imported intermediates in total sectoral output for manufacturing (associated
typically with the di⁄erentiated sector) and agriculture and mining (the "homogenous" good sectors)3
3Rauch (1999) classi￿es homogenous and di⁄erentiated goods on the basis of whether they are traded on an organized
exchange or not. Most agricultural and mining products can be classi￿ed as homogenous goods in this way.
4for selected OECD countries and large emerging economies based on the data available from the
OECD.4 For all countries, the share of imported intermediates in total output of manufacturing is at
least two times higher than the share of imported intermediates in agriculture with the same being
true for mining in most countries. On average, the end sectoral value of manufacturing output has a
3.3 times more intensive use of imported intermediates than agriculture. The simple average for all 36
countries in the available sample gives an average value of imported intermediates in total output of
manufacturing of 0.2. Assuming a markup of 25% in both industries implies that roughly 25% of the
cost in manufacturing comes from imported intermediates versus 7.6% in agriculture. The importance
of imported intermediates in manufacturing is even more pronounced for smaller economies. For
example, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia all have the
imported intermediate share of total output well above 30% with Ireland achieving a stunning 46%.
Our assumptions are thus supported by the available OECD data.
In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3 we discuss the conditions under which deindustri-
alization occurs, both for the small and the large country. Section 4 provides simulations and Section
5 concludes. Proofs and ￿gures are in the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Consumption, Production and International Trade
The setup of the model is standard except for the assumptions on intermediate good production, usage
and trade. There are two countries indexed by k = i;j with population Lk. Throughout the paper we
assume that country i is a larger country, i.e. Li > Lj. There are three types of goods produced in
each economy: di⁄erentiated ￿nal goods, intermediate goods used in the production of the ￿nal goods
and a homogenous good. Di⁄ferentiated and intermediate goods are considered as industrial goods
while the homogenous good is not.5 The two economies can exchange all goods that they produce.
There are trade costs of the iceberg type on international trade of order ￿ > 1 on all goods.
Consumers in country k have Cobb-Douglas preferences over available di⁄erentiated good varieties
(with a Dixit-Stiglitz subindex for the di⁄erentiated good consumption with 0 < ￿ < 1) and a
4We do not have ￿ner data to show the share of imported intermediates in the total cost. Note also that the value of
imported intermediates itself is typically derived by every reporting country using an import proportionality assumption
(i.e. that imports are used for the same purposes as domestically produced goods) while constructing the import-output
tables.
5Data from the input-output tables reveals that most of the inputs into the production of industrial goods come















where cl;k is the consumption in country k of a typical variety from country l, c0;k is the consumption
of the homogenous good in country k and ￿ is the consumption share of di⁄erentiated goods.
Consumers derive their income from selling their endowment of labor services (one unit) and ￿rms￿
dividends that locate in their home country. We normalize the wage in country i to 1 and label the
small country j0s wage as w.
There are no barriers to entry in the homogenous good sector. The production function in each
country is constant returns to scale with labor as the only factor of production. We normalize the
technology so that one unit of local labor is required to produce one unit of the homogenous good.
The assumption that the homogenous good production does not use any traded intermediates is of
course a simpli￿cation. Nevertheless, we observe in Table 1 that the share of imported intermediates
in sectors associated with "homogenous" goods such as agriculture or mining is much lower than that
in the manufacturing sectors.
There are two varieties of intermediate goods, both are produced using only labor under con-
stant returns to scale. We assume that each country has a su¢ ciently large Ricardian technological
advantage in the production of one variety that under free trade each country will specialize in the
production of one variety only. We choose units so that one unit of country k￿ s labor is required to
produce one unit of the intermediate good z in which country k has the technological advantage.6
Di⁄erentiated goods are produced in both countries using the two country-speci￿c intermediates with
the following Cobb-Douglas technology:




f + Yjs = (zi)
’ (zj)
1￿’ (3)
where f is the ￿xed cost of production measured in units of the ￿nal good and Yks are the amount of
variety s produced in country k. Hence the marginal cost of production is constant, but the technology
has increasing returns as there is a ￿xed cost that has to be borne by each ￿rm.
We assume that in each country the production of the di⁄erentiated good uses more intensively
6Since the absolute value of the relative wage cannot exceed ￿ in our model, an absolute value of technological
advantage of ￿2 is su¢ cient to ensure that each country specializes in only one variety with free trade.
6the local intermediate than the foreign intermediate.7 Hence, ￿ > 0:5 and 1￿’ > 0:5:8 We allow the
two countries to di⁄er in the intensity in which the imported intermediate is used in the production
of di⁄erentiated goods.
A ￿rm that wishes to enter the ￿nal good industry can invent costlessly a new product variety. Let
the constant marginal cost of production in each country be Ck. There is monopolistic competition
in this sector. Each ￿rm maximizes its own pro￿ts by setting the price at pkk = Ck
￿ for the domestic
market and pk;￿k = ￿Ck
￿ for the foreign market. There is free entry into this sector so that pro￿t is
zero in equilibrium. In country k therefore the zero pro￿t condition is going to be
(pkk ￿ Ck)ckk + ￿ (pkk ￿ Ck)ck;￿k = fCk (4)
As all ￿rms from each country face the same demand and have the same costs, they are the same
in size. There are therefore Nk representative ￿rms locating in country k.
2.2 Solving the model
For the ease of comparison with the previous literature and to highlight the role of imported interme-
diates in ￿nal goods production, we ￿rst solve the model in terms of marginal costs of production of
the ￿nal goods in the two countries. We assume ￿rst of all that the homogenous good is not traded
and that the number of ￿nal goods ￿rms in both countries is non-negative. A wage di⁄erential of ￿ is
required before trade in the homogenous good will take place.
From the zero pro￿t condition (4) and monopolistic pricing we can derive the equilibrium number
of ￿rms in the ￿nal good sectors in both countries. The number of ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated good






























7General insights do not depend on this assumption, but this assumption is realistic and limits the number of
cases that need to be discussed. As the intermediates are produced using a constant returns to scale technology, this
assumption implies that the share of local labor in the production of the ￿nal good is no lower than that of foreign
labor. This is the case when for example local labor is required alongside intermediates in a production function that
uses the two traded intermediate inputs with the same production share.
































where e f is a constant depending on the ￿xed cost f and parameters ￿ and ￿. Keeping the marginal
costs constant, the number of ￿rms in country i increases as the market size Li increases and decreases
with the foreign market size.
The trade balance equation from the point of view of the large country can be rewritten as a
function of wages, marginal costs and intermediate demands as:
Nicijpij ￿ Njcjipji = Ni (cii + ￿cij + f) f DIj￿w ￿ Nj (cjj + ￿cji + f) f DIi￿ (7)
where f DIi and f DIj are the foreign inputs from country i and j demanded to manufacture a unit of
the di⁄erentiated good respectively.
The expression on the left hand side represents the trade balance in di⁄erentiated goods while the
right hand side captures the trade balance in intermediate goods. Keeping wages constant, as the size
of the large country increases, the trade balance in di⁄erentiated goods becomes more positive for the



















The reverse, however, is true for the trade balance in intermediate goods. Taking the derivative of

























A < 0 (9)























































For there to be a positive number of ￿rms in both countries, we require that the ￿rms (because
8of free entry) do not wish to enter the sector in only one of the countries. The latter can happen
if production costs in one location are so much lower than in the other location so that it pays
for all ￿rms to enter the sector in the country with lowest costs and serve the other market from




















> 0 which implies that the ￿nal good production cost di⁄erential must
lie within the following bounds: ￿ =
Cj
Ci 2 (￿￿￿;￿￿). Otherwise, as one can verify from equations (5)
and (6) either Ni < 0 or Nj < 0.9 In the case of the original Krugman model, ￿ = w (the ￿nal good
production uses only local labor). Then if w = ￿￿1 < ￿￿￿, Ni < 0. That is, at the wage that would
give rise to exports of the homogenous good from the small country, the cost di⁄erential of producing
in the large (high wage) country is higher than the cost of accessing the foreign (large) market (￿￿) by
producing in the small (low wage) country. Hence, all ￿rms will want to locate in the small country.
This underlies the gist of Davis (1988) argument that small countries need not fear deindustrialization
with economic integration.
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1￿’ (11)
We observe that even when relative wage is equal to ￿￿1, the relative cost of ￿nal good production
can still lie within the bounds (￿￿￿;￿￿).10 With our assumptions on ￿ and ’ it su¢ ces that ￿ 2
9The argument can be also easily seen while inspecting the pro￿ts of a ￿rm when it decides to enter a particu-
lar production location or not. If the ￿rm locates in country i to serve both markets from that location, the pro￿ts










where e Ai and e Aj from the perspective of the
￿rm are two constants comprising the information about markets in country i and j and containing the monop-
olistic pricing parameters ￿. The pro￿ts in market j are then ￿j = Cj
￿￿
￿ e Ai (￿Cj)
￿ 1
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. Hence, if the ￿rm entered in coun-
try i, it would not be able to earn enough pro￿ts to cover the ￿xed cost. In other words, its pro￿ts while locating in
market j are higher.
10The cost di⁄erential in the production of ￿nal goods between countries depends crucially on the production function
in place. The introduction of trade in intermediates may not only dampen the cost di⁄erence between countries but even
reverse it. For example, if the production function is of the CES type and the inputs are complements in production,
then the country with the higher local wage can be the cheaper location for ￿nal goods production with positive trade




￿ . Then the corresponding cost of














￿ . If ￿ < 0
then Ci < Cj if w < 1. We did not use a more general production function like this one as the resulting model can only
be analyzed numerically.
9(’ ￿ ￿;’ + ￿). This is however insu¢ cient to guarantee that the small country will deindustrialize
upon opening to trade. We need to derive the conditions under which the small economy￿ s equilibrium
relative wage indeed will reach ￿￿1 which is necessary for the small economy to become an exporter
of the homogenous good. Note that by becoming a net exporter of the homogenous good, the small
economy must necessarily deindustrialize, that is, devote a larger fraction of its labor resources to the
production of the homogenous good and less to the industrial intermediate and ￿nal di⁄erentiated
goods compared to autarky. This is because when in autarky an economy devotes a fraction (1 ￿ ￿)
of its labor force to the production of the homogenous good for domestic consumption. Additional
labor is needed for export production. Hence, in what follows, deindustrialization is said to occur
when a country becomes an exporter of the homogenous good. In the following section we derive the
su¢ cient conditions for deindustrialization to be possible in both the small and the large country.
3 Conditions for deindustrialization
To solve the model completely, one needs to solve equations (5) ￿(7) and to ￿nd the number of ￿rms
Ni and Nj and the wage w in the equilibrium without trade in the homogenous good. Unfortunately,
one cannot solve for an explicit expression for the wage in general. Therefore, we can only narrow
down a set of parameters which are su¢ cient for deindustrialization to occur both for the small and
the large country.
For the small country to deindustrialize, we require ￿rst of all that its relative wage is su¢ ciently
smaller than that of the large country. In the previous home market literature, the smaller country
necessarily has a lower wage (see Krugman 1980) for otherwise ￿rms will prefer to relocate to the larger
market to save on transport costs. In our model however, the small country may have a larger wage
depending on parameter values. This is because the equilibrium relative wage depends on the net trade
balance on both ￿nal and intermediate goods. As seen above, the net trade balance in intermediate
goods of the large country is a decreasing function of the relative size of the large country. The large
country may have such a high demand for intermediates that at equal wage, the net trade balance is
in favor of the small country which must therefore have a higher equilibrium wage. Therefore we need
to ￿nd conditions such that the relative wage of the small country is a monotonic declining function
of the relative size of the large country assuming that both produce di⁄erentiated goods (interior
equilibrium). This is to ensure that there exists a size di⁄erential at which the relative wage of the
small country will reach ￿￿1 if an interior equilibrium exists. We have the following Lemma:






and ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿, the equilibrium relative wage w of the small
country at an interior equilibrium is a decreasing function of the relative size Li
Lj.
Proof : see appendix.
Lemma 1 says that the small country￿ s relative wage is a declining function of the relative size of
the large country if transport costs are small enough and the share of the domestic intermediate in
the ￿nal good production in the large country ￿ is large. Small transport costs are needed to generate
a strong home market e⁄ect so that the demand for the large country￿ s labor is strong and hence the
small country￿ s wage is low. To understand why ￿ needs to be high we note that as ￿ falls, for each
unit of the ￿nal goods produced the large country imports now more small-country intermediates.
Ceteris paribus, this worsens the large country trade balance and increases the relative wage of the
small country. For a ￿ close enough to 0:5 it may well be that an increase in the relative size increases
the demand for the small country intermediate so much that the countering ￿nal good ￿ ow does not
balance the increased demand in intermediates. This will be more pronounced as the trade cost is
increasing and the strength of the home market e⁄ect is weaker. We can show indeed that as ￿ ! 0:5






the relative wage becomes increasing with the relative size Li
Lj (see also
Section 4 below for an example). Note that realistic parameter values ful￿ll the conditions of Lemma
1: for example for ￿ = 0:8, ’ = 0:2 (averages taken from Table 1) and ￿ = 0:8 the trade cost has to
be lower than
p
2 so that the statement is true.
The above restrictions on parameters are however, not su¢ cient to guarantee the existence of a
relative size di⁄erential above which the small country will deindustrialize. This is because as relative
size increases there will come a point whereby all di⁄erentiated goods ￿rms will have moved to the
large country and this can occur before the relative wage of the small country declines to ￿￿1.11 Once
such a corner equilibrium is reached, the relative wage for the small country cannot fall further but
instead will rise as the size of the large country increases further. This is because the demand for
imported intermediates by the large country increases while there is no counterbalancing increasing
trade surplus from the ￿nal goods sector (since there is no further reallocation of ￿rms from the small
country). The following lemma describes the behavior of the relative wage after the corner equilibrium
is reached.
11An increase in the size di⁄erential may have a weak impact on the wage as a larger country demands also more
intermediate goods from the small economy which pushes the relative wage upwards. Hence, before wages fall to ￿￿1
the size di⁄erence between the countries may grow so large that all ￿rms in the ￿nal good sector want to move to the
larger market.
11Lemma 2 In a corner equilibrium whereby all di⁄erentiated goods ￿rms are located in the large coun-







Proof : see appendix.
To summarize, as the relative size increases, the relative wage of the small country falls until
the corner equilibrium is reached and thereafter, the relative wage will start to increase. The cor-
ner equilibrium may be reached before the small country￿ s equilibrium wage reaches ￿￿1 and hence
deindustrialization of the small economy is not possible. We therefore require further restrictions on
parameters for deindustrialization to occur. In Proposition 1 below, we ￿nd a su¢ cient condition for
there to exist a size di⁄erential large enough that the small country deindustrializes with trade.
Proposition 1 If ￿ > 1 ￿ ’, ￿ ￿ ’ > 1 ￿ ￿ and for trade costs low enough then there exists a size
di⁄erential between country i and j so that the wage in the (smaller) country j is w = ￿￿1 and the
small economy exports the homogenous good.
Proof: see appendix.
With trade costs low enough and ￿ ￿ ’ > 1 ￿ ￿ we know from Lemma 1 that wages fall as the
size di⁄erential between countries increases. Low transport costs also guarantee that the relative wage
w = ￿￿1 implied by an interior equilibrium is reached before the corner equilibrium occurs. Therefore
the small economy may become deindustrialized with low trade costs - i.e. be the net exporter of the
homogenous good - when the home market e⁄ect is strong and the trading partner￿ s relative size lies
within a certain range. If the relative size becomes too big, the corner equilibrium in which all ￿nal
good sector ￿rms move to the larger economy is obtained. We note that it is necessary that the small
economy uses the foreign intermediate more intensively than the large country.12,13 We observe from
Table 1 that larger economies typically have a lower usage of foreign intermediates in manufacturing.
For a realistic case with parameters ￿ = 0:8; ￿ = 0:8 a small country with 1 ￿ ’ < 0:8 paired with
a country large enough (for example, twice the size) will deindustrialize with trade opening if trade
12In the case with ￿ = 1￿’, we ￿nd that although the home market e⁄ect holds for parameters ful￿lling the conditions
of Lemma 1, it is too weak to induce a wage di⁄erential that would make trade in homogenous goods feasible. Before
the wage can fall to w = ￿￿1 as the size di⁄erential between the economies increases, the smaller economy loses all its
di⁄erentiated goods ￿rms. The large country￿ s demand for the small country intermediates is too strong to allow for
too large a fall in wages.
13Davis (1998) observed that actually trade costs in the homogenous goods appear to be somewhat larger than those
in di⁄erentiated goods. Here, we can obtain deindustrialization of the small economy with such an assumption if the
share of the foreign imported intermediates in the small economy production of the di⁄erentiated good is high enough.
12costs are small enough.
So far we have discussed the conditions for deindustrialization of the small economy. We observe
from Lemma 2 that if the relative size of the large country is su¢ ciently large, the corner equilibrium
wage may eventually reach ￿. This implies that the large country then becomes the exporter of the
homogenous good. The large country￿ s demand for the small country￿ s intermediates is so large that
exports of di⁄erentiated goods are not su¢ cient to cover the trade de￿cit in intermediates and hence
export of the homogenous good becomes necessary. Thus the large country deindustrializes while
remaining at the same time an exporter of di⁄erentiated goods. This result holds also for the case
with ￿ = 1 ￿ ’, i.e. when the share of intermediates in production of the ￿nal goods is the same
in the small and the large country.14 We obtain it because of our assumption of de facto national
di⁄erentiation of the intermediate goods. The small economy￿ s intermediate is not easily substitutable
with the large economy intermediate.
4 Simulations
We present three types of simulations. First, we show the combinations of parameter values of ’ and
￿ so that deindustrialization can occur in either the small or the large economy. Next, we show how,
ceteris paribus, the wage changes with the size di⁄erential and ￿nally how it varies as the trade cost
is increased.
In Figures 1 ￿3 we show parameter values when the implied interior equilibrium wage falls below
w = ￿￿1 and there must be exports of the homogenous good from the small economy. The small
economy becomes deindustrialized. In the case presented in Figure 2 we note that we obtain deindus-
trialization with ￿ = 0:8 (which corresponds to the average share of intermediates in total production
that we have in our data in Table 1) for the size di⁄erential Li
Lj = 2, ￿ = 0:8 and a wide range of small
country intermediate import shares ’ > 0:2.
In Figure 4 we present a case of ￿deindustrialization￿on the part of the large country for trade costs
that are large enough. The home market e⁄ect is then weak (but holds for the simulations presented
here) but the larger economy requires also a lot of the foreign intermediate inputs in production (here
1￿￿ = 0:4). This increases the equilibrium wage of the small country and may actually lead to w = ￿
enabling the large economy to be the homogenous good exporter.
14If the size di⁄erential between the two economies becomes arbitrarily large, the small economy may end up pro-
ducing only the intermediate goods. Then the wage in the small economy will increase even above w = ￿ as long as
it is more pro￿table to engage in international trade to obtain intermediates. We do not consider this special extreme
case. Nevertheless, then the large economy would be exporting the homogenous good to the small economy as well.
13In Figures 5￿ 6 we present the wages as a function of the size di⁄erential (the equilibrium wage
is the black solid line). In the ￿rst case shown, with ￿ = 1:1;￿ = 0:8;￿ = 0:8 and ’ = 0:22 as
the size di⁄erential increases from one the wage is falling until it hits w = ￿￿1 when trade in the
homogenous good starts (the wage implied by an interior equilibrium is the dashed line). As the size
di⁄erential increases further, a size di⁄erential is reached where there are no more ￿rms in the smaller
economy: a new entrant there would be unable to capture a market share (and consequently earn the
corresponding pro￿ts) high enough to pay for the ￿xed cost. The small country wage starts increasing
with the size di⁄erential as the larger economy demands ever more intermediates to produce ￿nal
goods driving the demand for labor in the small economy up. When the wage implied in the corner
equilibrium hits w = ￿ the large economy starts to export the homogenous good to equilibrate the
trade balance. We can speak then of the deindustrialization of the large economy: labor is driven out
of manufacturing of ￿nal and intermediate goods.
In the second case, with ￿ = 1:3;￿ = 0:6;￿ = 0:8 and ’ = 0:42, the wage in the smaller economy is
increasing as the size di⁄erential increases even when we have an interior equilibrium. This is because
the home market e⁄ect (increasing the trade balance in favor of the larger economy) is weak and the
value of intermediates purchased by the larger economy is increasing as the size di⁄erential rises.
In Figure 7 we show wages (in solid black line) as a hypothethical function of the trade cost. For
low trade costs, the small economy becomes deindustrialized. As the trade cost is increasing, the
home market e⁄ect is weaker; consequently there is a lower trade imbalance in di⁄erentiated goods
and the equilibrium wage in the small economy increases. With a trade cost that is high enough the
home market e⁄ect is even weaker; and the large economy imports relatively more intermediate goods
from the small economy than it exports the di⁄erentiated goods. This causes the wage in the small
country to increase above that of the large country.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that if production of di⁄erentiated goods uses imported intermediate
inputs, one does not require trade cost in homogenous goods to be su¢ ciently lower than that of
di⁄erentiated goods for economic integration to lead to deindustrialization of small countries. The
latter is possible because the relative wage of the small country may fall su¢ ciently to lead to export
of the homogenous good without the relative cost of production of the small country being so low that
all ￿rms will prefer to produce in the small country. Our simulations results show that for a broad
range of reasonable parameter values, one can indeed obtain deindustrialization of the small country.
14In addition we also show that when trading with a very large country, the small country may become
specialized in the production of intermediate goods while the large country becomes exporter of both
di⁄erentiated and homogenous good. Thus deindustrialization is possible for a large country too. Our
results have been obtained assuming that the intermediate goods are produced under constant returns
to scale and whose trade is governed by Ricardian technological advantage. If all inputs are produced
under increasing returns to scale with the intermediate producing ￿rms able to choose location our
results obviously would not be valid. However, as long as there is some inputs trade governed by
comparative advantage or national product di⁄erentiation our general insight will carry through.
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16A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Rewrite the trade balance (10) as
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As argued in the main text, for there not to be incentive for ￿rms to strictly prefer one location to
the other we need the relative wage to lie within bounds such that g (w) is positive. Then for trade
balance condition to hold we will require that h(w) to be positive as well. Therefore for wages to be
a declining function of relative size a su¢ cient condition is to have g0 (w) < 0 and h0 (w) < 0 since
then f0 (w) = g0 (w)h(w) + g (w)h0 (w) < 0.
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then h0 (w) < 0. Now we want to check when the numerator of the derivative






















































































We see that g0 (w) < 0 if
￿
1￿￿ > 1. This requires that ￿ ￿ ’ > 1 ￿ ￿.￿
Proof of Lemma 2











One can rewrite the trade balance (7) in this case as








because the large country exports ￿nal goods whereas the small economy exports intermediates re-
quired for production. Solving out eq. (14) after substituting for Ni from eq. (13) we obtain the
result in (12).￿
Proof of Proposition 1
We need to ￿nd conditions such that the relative wage of the small economy reaches w = ￿￿1
before the corner equilibrium is reached. This requires that at the relative size whereby the interior
equilibrium wage is ￿￿1, the corresponding corner equilibrium wage is below ￿￿1.15
From (10) we can ￿nd the size di⁄erential that implies a wage in the interior equilibrium of w = ￿￿1.
15If the corresponding corner equilibrium wage is above ￿￿1 it would imply that at the interior equilibrium, the
number of ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated sector in the smaller economy is negative. The ￿rms from the small economy
would be unable to meet their zero pro￿t conditions. Proof available upon request.


































































































































































































> 0 by assumption for the equilibrium to

















































< 1 if ￿ > 1 ￿ ’. We also know that ￿￿
￿ 2￿
1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1 for ￿ ￿ 1 and
1 + ￿ ￿ 2’ > 0, therefore for trade costs small enough the condition (15) will hold. ￿
19B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Shares of imported intermediates in total industry output 1991-2000
Country Agriculture Mining and Manufacturing
quarrying
Belgium 0:109 0:206 0:373
Canada 0:075 0:070 0:254
China 0:017 0:042 0:081
France 0:069 0:113 0:147
Czech Rep. 0:056 0:092 0:381
Germany 0:073 0:073 0:168
Italy 0:020 0:049 0:179
Japan 0:016 0:007 0:064
Ireland 0:190 0:253 0:462
Korea Rep. 0:026 0:008 0:227
Netherlands 0:072 0:075 0:321
United Kingdom 0:077 0:053 0:171
United States 0:037 0:061 0:077
Simple average for 36 countries 0:061 0:075 0:202
Simple average for largest sampled 18 countries 0:042 0:052 0:155
Simple average for smallest sampled 18 countries 0:080 0:071 0:248
Data source: OECD Input-Output Database, 2006 edition revision 1. "Agriculture" contains the sector "Agriculture,
hunting, forestry and ￿shing" (sectors 1+2+5 according to the ISIC Rev.3 code), "Mining and quarrying" contains data
from sectors labeled 3+4 according to the ISIC Rev.3 code while manufacturing contains sectors classi￿ed in positions
4-25 in the OECD input-output tables (sectors labeled 15 to 37 according to the ISIC Rev.3 code). Countries ranked
in size according to 1995 GDP at PPP levels taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2.
20Figure 1: Parameters for which deindustrialization of the small economy takes place. Case: Li
Lj =
2;￿ = 0:9;￿ = 0:8
Figure 2: Parameters for which deindustrialization of the small economy takes place. Case: Li
Lj =
2;￿ = 0:8;￿ = 0:8
21Figure 3: Parameters for which deindustrialization of the small economy takes place. Case: Li
Lj =
2;￿ = 0:7;￿ = 0:8
Figure 4: Parameters for which deindustrialization of the large economy takes place. Case: Li
Lj =
2;￿ = 0:6;￿ = 0:8
22Figure 5: Wages in the small economy as a function of the size di⁄erential. Case: ￿ = 1:1;￿ = 0:8;￿ =
0:8;’ = 0:22
Figure 6: Wage in the smaller economy as a funtion of the size di⁄erential. Case: ￿ = 1:3;￿ = 0:6;￿ =
0:8;’ = 0:42
23Figure 7: Wages in the small economy as a function of trade cost. Case: Li
Lj = 2;￿ = 0:8;￿ = 0:8;’ =
0:22
24